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Abstract
With ever increasing global integration, productivity improvements depend not only
on in-house innovative efforts, but on those of international partners as well. This paper
explores the impact of foreign R&D on productivity and technical efficiency of countries
by considering three major channels of embodied and disembodied spillovers, namely
trade, foreign direct investment and patenting, and controlling for direct licensing of
foreign technologies. Furthermore, it contrasts these effects across 47 developed and
transition countries between 1990 and 2009. Overall, I find that trade remains the
dominant factor behind productivity and technical progress, while the effects of FDI-
and patent-related spillovers are significantly smaller. The effect of foreign patenting is
larger in developed nations while imports, inward FDI and foreign technology licensing
are important sources of know-how for transition economies. The aggregate gains
from spillovers appear larger for latter, confirming their significance in the process of
development and catching-up.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, globalization has accelerated both the rate of technological in-
novation and its diffusion worldwide [7]. The literature postulates research and development
(R&D) efforts as the cornerstone of productivity and economic growth [38,70]. However, few
can reap these benefits, since most R&D is carried out exclusively in a handful of industrial-
ized nations, with few new players joining this club [42]1. As a result, most countries depend
on knowledge inflows from abroad to augment their productivity, and ultimately, economic
competitiveness [49]. Thus, identifying the impact of these technology spillovers and the
channels through which they operate, will help understanding the existing worldwide dis-
crepancies in income per capita [41], and enunciate pertinent policy insights for developing
and transition economies competing in global markets [34].
Technology transfer occurs between countries, sectors, firms or individuals and can take
many forms. The literature investigates technological content that spills over via imported
intermediates [27,54], equipment of multinationals [2,39,71] or skilled human capital [66,53].
Moreover, technical knowledge may diffuse in disembodied forms such as patents [8,76],
licensing agreements [63,83], R&D contracting and outsourcing [20,69], and communication
[74,82]. While patenting has been analyzed quite extensively [31,54], downstream revenues
from it and other forms of intellectual property remain relatively unexplored, especially in
large cross-sections [60]. Secondly, while theoretical arguments support multiple channels
through which technical know-how migrates between firms, sectors and countries, empirical
validations of these avenues remains rather scant [39,54]. Moreover, a significant problem
is the lack of reliable data for many developing and transition economies, exactly those for
which theory predicts larger spillovers [64] with crucial implications for exports [5], growth
and catch-up [32].
This paper proposes several contributions to the literature as follows. First, it quantifies
1Hall [42] shows that the concentration of R&D activities is decreasing slowly over time from 0.78 in 1999
to 0.75 in 2005, as opposed to an unchanged 0.69 in both years for GDP.
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both embodied and disembodied sources for spillovers of foreign R&D. To this purpose, it
considers four alternative channels for foreign technological content, namely trade and FDI
for embodied knowledge, plus international patenting and licensing for disembodied one.
With the exception of trade, the magnitude and effects of other channels of diffusion are
still debated in the literature [10,35]. Moreover, while the effects of these channels have
been explored in isolation by previous work, assessing their relative effectiveness in diffu-
sion of technology remains an open question [49]. Secondly, this work contrasts the effects
of spillovers across a panel of both developed Western economies and transition countries
from Eastern Europe (CEECs) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CISs). The
latter had mixed performance both in terms of R&D and growth rates, as a result of past
dependence in terms of scientific and economic specialization to the socialist era [16,52].
Finally, this study deals with issues related to non-stationarity, cointegration and dynamic
estimation to obtain robust results on the effect of embodied and disembodied spillovers on
productivity and technical efficiency of countries.
The empirical results confirm the paramount role of trade in diffusion of new technolo-
gies, consistent with previous findings [25,54,81]. FDI is particularly important for tran-
sition economies, as multinationals (MNEs) boost significantly host countries productivity
and GDP levels [34]. The spillover effects from foreign patents are prevalent in developed
economies that utilize this channel efficiently to tap new knowledge produced by MNEs active
in these markets [80]. Oppositely, emerging markets lack the capacity and the intellectual
property enforcement tools to attract MNEs to patent domestically or set-up R&D facilities.
Finally, direct acquisition of foreign technologies through licensing agreements translates
into greater total factor productivity and technical efficiency gains for transition economies
that are further from the global technological frontier. In today’s global economy densely
inter-linked through trade, investment and knowledge exchanges, developing countries ben-
efit significantly from foreign spillovers to accelerate their development and “catch”-up with
the industrialized world. These results shed light on the relative importance and effective-
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ness of these channels and provide concrete pointers for policy-makers in these countries.
Trade, FDI and bilateral patenting with developed and R&D intensive countries all bear
positive effects on productivity levels [19,50]. However, effects vary across countries based
on their portfolio of trade,FDI and innovating partners and their relative R&D intensity2.
These indirect sways are stimulated by good institutions [18,26,75], highly skilled human
capital [9,62] and incentives for foreign firms to develop local high-tech capabilities, such as
local R&D units [29,43]. Unlike embodied spillovers, imports of technologies contribute di-
rectly to total productivity via domestic firms that make these purchases. This represents a
more expensive, yet faster, alternative for developing countries to move closer to the world’s
technological frontier, and recent history provides us with several examples of countries (e.g.
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China) that have been successful utilizing this strategy to
boost their economic performance3.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section provides a discussion of the
literature on the international R&D spillovers. Section 3 details the empirical framework
used, starting with the background model, data and variables employed, econometric inves-
tigation and subsequent checks for robustness. Finally, Section 4 concludes and discusses
policy implications stemming from this work.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Embodied versus disembodied spillovers
R&D investments spur new knowledge about materials and processes, ways of recombining
them to produce new goods and services. However, in practice, such benefits are impossible
to be fully internalized. Thus, it is interesting to quantify the effects of these ”spillovers”
2By having extensive networks in all these areas, a country has more chances of drawing upon multiple
sources of spillovers: imports, inward FDI and inward patents
3During 2001 to 2006, China has imported technology worth more than 90 billion US$, mostly from EU,
Japan and the US.
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throughout a sector or economy, and secondly seek ways to maximize them. Endogenous
growth models see R&D spillovers as a significant source of growth, and starting with the
work of Coe and Helpman [27] a large body of literature has brought numerous empirical
evidence to support to this conventional wisdom [71].
However, the type of underlying R&D process plays an important role in identifying
and classifying spillovers. Los and Verspagen [58] classify R&D efforts as “process-oriented”
(aiming at lowering production costs) and “product-oriented” (focusing on developing new
products or improving quality of the existing ones). This classification has a particular influ-
ence on the type of spillovers analyzed, since process R&D is usually protected using secrecy,
while product R&D is exposed in produced goods. Furthermore, in a famous contribution,
Griliches [37] distinguishes two types of R&D externalities, namely the knowledge spillovers
(disembodied) and rent spillovers (embodied). The latter implies that the price of imported
intermediate goods does not fully reflect the amount of innovative efforts undertaken to de-
velop them, mainly due to competitive pressures in oligopolistic markets [24]. In contrast,
spillovers from knowledge arise because due to imperfect appropriability without involving
any economic transaction4. While disembodied spillovers are difficult to quantify due to
their immaterial nature, common empirical strategies involve adopting various proxies, such
as technological proximity measures [13,54,65]. Moreover, both types are highly correlated
across countries and time posing additional econometric problems.
2.2 Multiple channels for technological spillovers and learning
2.2.1 Imports
Starting with Coe and Helpman [27] and Coe et al. [28], the literature has documented
in great detail the role of trade (particularly, imports) in facilitating the exchange of tech-
4By definition, knowledge is a quasi public good with non-rival and non-excludability characteristics. For
example, it would be extremely hard to prevent one from using knowledge (e.g. using the Pythagorean
theorem to find the length of a triangle’s side) and moreover this usage will not diminish the quantity or
quality of this knowledge left for others to use.
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nological information between firms, industries and countries [25,53,54]. Studies employing
sectoral data for OECD countries confirm that the foreign R&D spillovers greatly influence
domestic productivity, complemented by intra- and inter-sectoral effects [1]. These results
are also in line with the product life cycle theory of Vernon [78], where development of new
cutting-edge technologies and products takes place in developed nations, and then diffuses
slowly to their Southern neighbors. Moreover, when analyzing worldwide exports at a fine
6 digit granulation, Hausmann et al. [44] finds that most developed nations are specialized
in sophisticated and high value-added products which confers them significant competitive
advantage. Furthermore, all these economies are clustered in a ”core” of the global trade
network (i.e. G-20 or OECD countries), which is very intensive both in terms of linkages
and in terms of R&D flows [74]. In contrast, transition countries (CEECs and CISCs) tend
to have much lower domestic R&D intensity (both public and private one) and are divided
around major regional trade poles, namely EU and Russia [16]5.
2.2.2 Foreign direct investment
FDI is emphasized in the international business literature as an important carrier of spillovers,
usually through expansions of multinational firms (MNEs) that transplant new equipment
and know-how to local markets [47,80,83]. Prior to the crisis, the volume and impact of
FDI has increased significantly worldwide from year to year.6. While the first FDI in-
flows to transition countries were quite small and geographically confined to Central Europe
(Poland, Czech Republic or Hungary), the post-2000 wave focused on far-Eastern firms in
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Overall, the bulk of investment concentrates in the tertiary
sector (trade, finance, communication), manufacturing and resources (especially for Russia
and other CIS states). The most important partners are European (Germany, Austria and
5South Eastern European countries have increased their shares of exports to the EU from 54% in 1993 to
62% in 2003; during the same period, the CIS countries decreased it from 46 to 39%, while the intra-regional
exchanges doubled from 38 to 78%.
6Globally, FDI inflows soared in 2006 to $ 1.306 billion, up 38 percent from 2005 and close to the record
level of $1,411 billion reached in 2000. Inflows increased in all three groups of economies (developing,
developed and transition) according to UNCTAD (2007).
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Netherlands) followed by the USA and Japan. The spillovers from multinationals (MNEs)
on productivity of domestic firms arise through several mechanisms [72]: i) demonstration
effects (adoption or imitation of MNE technology by domestic firms); (ii) labor turnover
(workers possessing new knowledge, tacit in essence, switch from MNE to domestic em-
ployers or start new businesses); iii) vertical linkages (MNEs transfer technology to their
suppliers or customers). Despite the strength of these arguments, the empirical evidence is
quite mixed. While early studies [2,30,82] find no effects or even negative spillovers from
foreign firms on domestic productivity, more recent findings [34,36,53,83] argue the oppo-
site7. Given the inconsistency of these findings, further explanations have included also the
role of absorptive capacity (either in the form of existing knowledge base or human capital)
and institutional settings [12,18]. The level of analysis (firm-, sector- or country-) has also
implications in terms of results. Although firm level studies benefit from reliable data, they
often suffer from selection bias or country specific heterogeneity; similarly, sector and coun-
try level studies usually control for these aspects, but lack in terms of precision and ability
to isolate effects across firms [17].
2.2.3 Foreign patenting
Another channel through which technological content crosses borders is patenting done by
foreign firms and individuals in host markets. As new research gets patented, it becomes
available to the public and may be used to build upon and develop new technologies and
products. Bilateral patent statistics provide a direct link between origin and destinations
of knowledge, and prior research suggests that this tends to be geographically confined [46]
with national boundaries still relevant as barriers for technology diffusion [73]8. Multinational
firms (MNEs) entering other markets often protect some of their technological portfolio in
7In some cases of FDI in transition countries there is clear evidence of technology transfer (e.g. Volvo
in Poland, Valeo in Czech Republic or Nokia in Romania) but MNEs can also opt for medium- or low-tech
affiliates, depending on characteristics of the industry, markets, legislative norms, etc.
8For example, Romania had 1,003 patent applications in 2006 of which 78% were from domestic inven-
tors, 8% US (109), 3% German (44), 2% French (44) and 1% Japanese (22). Overall, there is significant
heterogeneity across countries in terms of these ratios and the origin of foreign applications.
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these countries by having domestic patents issued. Thus, these patents surpass national and
language barriers, with immediate effects on knowledge levels in these markets, eluding the
effect of geographical, technological and cultural distances between home and host countries.
Regarding the 47 countries considered in this study, the ratio of foreign patent applicants of
the total is higher (on average 41% between 1995 and 2009) in transition countries, all behind
the technology frontier and still rebuilding and restructuring their innovative competencies
[50].
Patents provide a straightforward channel for knowledge spillovers linking directly users
and sources of technologies [31]. Closely related to commercial prospects of new inventions,
patents are widely accepted proxies for innovation in the innovation literature, used to explore
various issues such as productivity [81] or foreign direct investment [14]. However, the
literature reports some important caveats of using patents as an indicator for innovation
[8,77]. First, not all knowledge is patentable, and moreover, it does not get patented,
so that patents are just a piece in a bigger realm of innovation in a country. Secondly,
most patents worldwide are granted at the ”Triadic” (USA-Japan-EU) patent offices, hence
in international comparisons developing and transition countries will likely suffer from a
downward bias (lower patenting) due to economic and cultural specifics that affect their
international patenting rates. This analysis will control for these issues and use patenting
in foreign markets as weight for spillovers from abroad. However, I expect that, due to
the flows of patenting and citations mainly occurring within Triad, and their relatively
narrow geographical reach even in these countries as pointed in the literature, patent related
spillovers to be less important (smaller in magnitude) than the main channels at work (trade
and investments). Moreover, the relative difference in market size implies that the most
important technologies will be patented in major markets (i.e. developed nations), hence
generating greater spillovers there than otherwise.
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2.2.4 Licensing of technologies
Lastly, a different branch of literature argues that the correlation between foreign R&D stocks
and productivity improvements reflects merely diffusion effects, and more importantly, it fails
to explain the underlying mechanisms of this process [6]. This work documents the existence
of sizeable markets for technology in various industries (chemical, software and electronics)
providing clear measures of technological transfers between countries. In contrast to previous
channels, acquisition of technology is a faster and more efficient way to import technology
across borders with strong effects on productivity 9. Cassiman and Veugelers [21] distinguish
between embodied technology via assets such as new personnel or (parts of) other firms and
disembodied technology through licensing, R&D contracting, outsourcing or technological
consulting. Moreover, Cassiman and Veugelers [20] find that firms tend to use these external
technology sources to complement existing in-house competencies. Hence, aggregating these
external payments and royalties the country level will provide direct evidence of technology
transfers in an international context [60] and with immediate impacts on productivity of
domestic firms. Within our dataset, all transition countries together spend on average, less
than the UK, the European leader in this respect. 10 However, data on international royalties
and licensing payments has its own limitations in terms of measuring technology exchanges.
First, in some cases most of these payments occur between MNEs and their affiliates without
involving directly domestic firms. Secondly, there is an intricate relationship between FDI
and licensing, one that is hard to disentangle in practice. Several case studies document in
detail gains from licensing in developing countries [22,29] but overall, the literature remains
deficitary in generalizing these results at the firm [23,58] and country level [60]. Building
on this literature, this study considers patenting and licensing as complementary channels
9In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan kept itself mostly closed to FDI and conditioned MNE presence to transfers
of technology to Japanese firms. Today, China mandates incoming MNEs to form joint ventures with local
partners as opposed to green-field projects. The aim is to facilitate knowledge transfers and assimilation for
domestic firms
10In 2005, CEECs spent over US$ 5 bln. to acquire technology from abroad while the total payments
for the UK was around US$ 9 bln. Among them, only Russia, Hungary and Poland were above the 1 bln.
threshold.
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for disembodied technology diffusion. While patent flows from a foreign country expand
the available knowledge stock of the host nation’s firms to build, adopt, imitate or patent
around it, these process is subject to a stochastic rate of success that depends greatly on
its absorptive capacity [51]. In contrast, technological payments provide a direct measure
of technological imports ready to be implemented in the production process with immediate
effects [20].
Testing together the concurrent effects of all these channels is a daunting task both in
conceptual and empirical terms [37]. It involves measuring several embodied and disembodies
sources of spillovers and disentangling their effects through efficient estimation techniques.
This study provides a first attempt at this challenging task by looking at imports, inward
FDI, incoming foreign patents and direct imports of technologies in a panel of 47 economies
over the period 1990 to 2009.
3 Empirical framework
3.1 Estimation model
Given the proposed research objective (i.e. to disentangle the concurrent effects of
several channels for R&D spillovers) the analysis is carried out at the country level employing
the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = AeλLαK1−αDRDψSηDS
φ
E (1)
where Y is the aggregated output (total GDP), A a constant, λ the rate of external tech-
nological change, L and K are the labor and respectively, capital employed in production.
DRDψrepresents the domestic stock of knowledge while SηD and S
φ
Eare the total foreign in-
flows of disembodied and respectively, the embodied technology. Time and country indexes
have been omitted to preserve simplicity. Taking logarithms and defining total factor produc-
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tivity (TFP) as a measure of the effects in total output caused by technological improvements
and efficiency gains, the equation can be rewritten as:
lnTFP = λ+ ψ lnDRD + η lnSD + φ lnSE (2)
Consistent with our previous conjectures these external flows are determined by:
SE = S
TRADE + SFDI (3)
SD = S
PAT +MTECH (4)
where the embodied technology transfer from a country j to i occurs via two channels: imports
of intermediate goods (STRADE) and foreign direct investment (SFDI)11. The sources of
disembodied technology include spillovers from foreign patenting (SPAT ) done in country i
by entities of j as well as direct technology purchases (MTECH) from country j. As a result
of international trade and investment, both domestic and foreign intermediate goods can be
employed in i’s production. The range of foreign knowledge is captured in this model by a
flow weighted foreign R&D matrix, where the flows are bilateral imports and inward FDI.
Similarly, patented knowledge in country j (recipient) resulted from i’s R&D investments
contributes to development of new intermediate goods in j, either through local R&D efforts
or direct licensing of technology. The following equations formalize these arguments by
computing these spillovers as weighted foreign R&D stocks, following Lichtenberg and Van
Potteslberghe de la Poterie [54]:
STRADEit =
n∑
j=1
Mijt ∗ FRDjt
Yjt
(5)
11FDI can act as a channel for both embodied (machinery, equipment) and disembodied (human capital,
know-how) technology transfer. For simplicity, I consider FDI as a source of embodied R&D spillovers.
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SFDIit =
n∑
j=1
FDIijt ∗ FRDjt
Yjt
(6)
SPATit =
n∑
j=1
PATijt ∗ FRDjt
Yjt
(7)
where i represents the home or recipient country and j is the foreign one. Mijt is the
flow of goods from i to j, FDIijt is the flow of investment from i to j, and PATijt is the
number of patents with assignees from j that are patented in i, FRDjt is the stock of R&D
of country j (foreign) and Yjt is the GDP of country j, all in year t. Spillovers are computed
as the sum of all weighted R&D intensity of all trade, investment and patenting partners
(i.e. the j s) of a country i. The greater R&D intensity of these partners or the absolute
value of these exchanges (imports, FDI inflows, foreign patenting)increase, the greater i’s
potential spillovers will be. Accounting for all these spillovers the full specification to be
tested becomes:
lnTFPit = λi+ψ lnDRDit+η1 lnS
TRADE
it +η2 lnS
FDI
it +φ1 lnS
PAT
it +φ2 lnM
TECH
it +εit (8)
where λi is a country specific intercept and εit is a mean zero term. I am particularly
interested if trade spillovers are greater for developed nations than otherwise (ηdevelop1 >
ηtransit1 ), the impact of FDI on productivity is smaller than that of trade (η2 < η1), while the
impact of patent spillovers is smaller than that of FDI (φ1 < η2) and that of direct purchases
of foreign technologies (φ1 < φ2).
3.2 Data and variables
As the source of technological spillovers I consider all 25 OECD countries that are re-
sponsible for most of world’s R&D investments (81% in 2004) and high-tech production. The
time span considered is 1990 to 2009, since prior to 1990 transition countries from Eastern
Europe and Central Asia were virtually closed to international trade and investments. This
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section details the construction of variables of interest. Additional details or the variable
construction and data sources used are presented in Appendix A.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is determined as the residual from the aggregated output
production function (1) using the country’s stock of capital, labor force and output assum-
ing constant returns to scale and shares of 0.65 and 0.35 to labor and capital, frequently
employed in the literature [25,27,81]. Moreover, robustness checks were performed to insure
the reliability of these estimates12. Comparable data on GDP and employment comes from
the Groningen Growth and Development Center and the Conference Board, Total Economy
Database. The values of capital stock are computed using data on aggregate investment
share as a percentage of GDP from the World Penn Tables version 6.2.
As an alternative measure, I compute a technical efficiency index using stochastic frontier
analysis on the same aggregated variables (output, labor, capital) following the methodology
of Battese and Coelli [11]. This method allows one to distinguish between various compo-
nents of productivity growth, such as a shift in production function for a country (technical
progress) or a movement along it (technical efficiency). Frontier techniques are particularly
interesting since the separation of efficiency effects and technical change has a direct inter-
pretation in terms of the catch-up debate. In this study, I am interested in the latter and
its relationship with international R&D spillovers.
Estimates of domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks are based on the gross expenditure
on R&D (GERD) that includes both the business sector spending and the public R&D from
universities or research institutes. In the case of origin countries of origin for spillovers
(OECD 25) data comes from OECD’s Main Science and Technology Indicators 2007, while
for transition countries I construct R&D stocks using data on GERD as a percentage of
GDP (from UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks, national statistics and the World Development
Indicators 2011 from the World Bank). To compute R&D stocks I employ the perpetual
inventory method described in Appendix A.
12a parametric estimation with second and third lags of the explanatory variable as instruments revealed
coefficients close to our assumption, namely 0.33 for capital and 0.63 for labor.
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The trade related R&D spillovers are computed following equation (5). Bilateral trade
flows are obtained from IMF’s Direction of Trade 2011 (DOTS). FDI spillovers are computed
in a similar manner following equation (6). Detailed inward FDI flows are procured from the
individual statistics of most of the OECD countries as reported in the annexes of UNCTAD’s
World Investment Report (various editions). The advantage of the former, as opposed to
the commonly employed OECD International Direct Investment Statistics, is its superior
consistency over time. However the UNCTAD data is checked for consistency, and gaps are
addressed using OECD investment data where available.
To quantify disembodied R&D spillovers, I use the WIPO (World International Patent
Office) data on patents granted to foreign and domestic applicants worldwide. This dataset
benefits from a long time dimension going back to the 1800s in some cases, detailed bilateral
flows and extensive country coverage, covering also transition countries from Eastern Europe
and Central Asia. However, its main drawback is that it provides only patent counts (grants
and applications) without additional information (e.g. patent citations) that could improve
accuracy of quantifying such spillovers. To cope with the inherent differences in patent
granting and success rated across countries, I opt for an indicator based on patent applications
rather than grants.
To analyze disembodied technology trade, I employ use flows of royalties and license fees
as a measure of technology purchases from abroad (World Development Indicators 2011).
These are payments and receipts between residents and non-residents of a country for the
authorized use of intellectual property (such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial
processes, and franchises) usually through licensing agreements.
Human capital is an important factor that affects TFP [65,66,67] both directly as qual-
itative parameter of the labor force engaged in production activities (L), and indirectly by
enhancing a country’s absorptive capacity. Therefore following previous studies [26,63], I
include the level of human capital as a control in all regressions. This variable (log school)
is the log of the average number of school years completed by the adult population aged 25
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and over. The data are taken from [7], and values are reported every five years. In order to
take advantage of the temporal dimension of the dataset, I have interpolated these values
linearly for the rest of intermediate years.
3.3 Preliminary analysis
To assess the relative effectiveness of the proposed four channels, I follow the speci-
fication described in equation (8). However, considering the close co-movements of these
variables over time, multicollinearity may become an issue for our estimations. Thus, in
order to minimize the incidence of such econometric problems I will limit the number of
controls used in the regressions to just the crucial ones (domestic R&D stocks, human cap-
ital endowments) presented in the literature. Instead of using a large battery of control
variables, to account for unobserved heterogeneity among countries, I include country fixed
effects in all estimations. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, while Table 3 reports the
correlation matrix for the variables of interest. Table 2 distinguishes between transition (trc)
and developed Western economies (wec) in the dataset, showing that there are significant
differences between these two groups both in terms of productivity (technical efficiency) as
well as in magnitudes of spillovers.
Secondly, to avoid spurious regression, since it is well known that some of these variables
tend to be non-stationary, I perform unit root and cointegration tests for all estimated
regressions. Last four columns of Table 1 show the results of several panel unit root tests
suggested by Levin et al. [56], Im et al. [45], Breitung [15] and Hadri [40]. The results of
these tests suggest that these variables are not stationary. Thus, to be able to use regression
analysis for estimating equation (5) one needs to find out a cointegration relationship among
these variables. I employ the three most powerful tests in this context proposed by Pedroni
[68]13. Their values and their significance levels are reported under each of the models
13These seven residual-based tests have a null hypothesis of no cointegration and allow for heterogeneous
cross sectional variance. Pedroni [65] concludes that the parametric group-t statistic and panel-t statistic
appear to have the highest power, followed by the panel-rho statistic.
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estimated. Overall, in most cases the null of no cointegration is rejected, which makes the
fixed effects estimations legitimate (not spurious).
Finally the estimation of spillovers effects on productivity is usually confronted with
problems of spurious regression and reverse causality14. To increase the robustness of these
conclusions, all estimations are carried out employing a dynamic ordinary least squares
estimator (DOLS) with country and time fixed effects. This estimator is shown in the litera-
ture to outperform in terms of efficiency other alternatives in the case of small cointegrated
panels [46] and is derived from the simple OLS one by adding extra lags and leads of the first-
differentiated regressors. The latter are meant to control for endogeneity and estimate the
standard errors on the basis of a long-run serial correlation robust error covariance matrix.
3.4 Econometric results
Table 4 reports the main estimations for the effects of foreign R&D spillovers on total
factor productivity. The first two variables (SFDI , STRADE) capture the impact of rent
spillovers or embodied knowledge via two channels (trade and FDI), while the other two
(SPAT , MTECH) focus on disembodied sources of knowledge employing technology imports
and foreign patenting as carriers. The models distinguish between general effects when
considering all countries (all) in the sample, transition economies (trc) and respectively
developed economies of Western Europe (wec). The reason behind this segregation is to
explore relative impacts of these channels for different sets of countries; the underlying
assumption, based on prior findings, is that the nature of trade, patenting and FDI differs
significantly between a developed and a transition or developing economy [23].
Models 1-3 examine the effect of embodied (imports and FDI) foreign spillovers on pro-
ductivity. Right from the start, trade’s coefficient is significantly bigger than FDI’s, and
remains the same throughout the remaining estimations (Model 2-9). Regardless of specifi-
14As Griliches [35] points out, the problem is to establish a causal relationship since future output and
productivity depend on past R&D, while in turn, the latter is a function of past output and expectations
about its future performance.
16
cations, there is strong support for our first hypothesis, that spillovers from FDI are lower
than those from trade, both in the case of Western (Model 2) and Eastern Europe/Central
Asia (Model 3). Domestic R&D stocks appear to impact productivity only in the case of
advanced economies that invest heavily in R&D both from private and public sources.
In a similar fashion, Models 4 through 6 focus on disembodied sources of technology
(foreign patents at the domestic patent office, plus royalties and payments for foreign tech-
nologies), and their relative impact on developed versus developing countries. The results
suggest greater effects of patent spillovers on productivity that those from direct licensing in
the case of Western Europe, while for transition countries the opposite holds. Patent related
spillovers are prevalent in Western (developed) countries, where more patents are exchanged
between holders and firms from other developed nations. This is consistent with previous
conclusions on the curvilinear effects of patenting on growth, suggesting that patent related
spillovers are more likely to occur at the extremes of the global income distribution [62],
whereas all transition countries fall in the middle of it. Moreover, there are significant qual-
ity differences between the patents granted in developing versus developed countries which
will also affect the quality of subsequent spillovers. Secondly, for transition countries these
effects are exacerbated by a volatile patenting output over time and a decreasing ratio of
foreign to domestic patenting in the 1990s. However, in terms of licensing, the effects on
productivity are greater for transition economies than otherwise, signaling that the techno-
logical investments made by firms yield important benefits, which are visible even at the
macro level. Finally, Models 7-9 include all postulated spillovers plus country fixed effects
and lagged and leads of the first-differentiated regressors (not reported), despite foreseen
collinearity problems given the construction of these variables. The results from separate
regressions are very similar, except that the magnitude of these effects changes for FDI and
technological licensing.
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3.5 Robustness checks
This section checks the robustness of the results to the use of different measures of technologi-
cal progress than TFP, separate estimations for each source (channel) of technology, inclusion
of more control variables, and interaction effects between spillovers and main variables of
interest.
3.5.1 Different measure of technical progress
While having access to technology relevant at the world frontier present countries with
the possibility to utilize them towards productivity improvements, this ultimately depends
on their existing absorptive capacity and technical efficiency levels. While for absorptive
capacity, I have utilized a widely known and adopted proxy, namely human capital, to assess
the technical efficiency level of a country I will employ a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
The production frontier refers to the maximum output attainable under a set of given inputs.
As such, countries can operate either within or on this frontier. At the national level this
can been decomposed into gains from efficiency and gains from technologies [11]. For the
purpose of this paper, I am interested in the latter. To technical efficiency parameters are
estimated on the basis of (1) by maximum likelihood using the frontier command in Stata
version 11.
Table 5 reports the results using the technical efficiency index obtained from the stochastic
frontier analysis. The results are very similar to those using total factor productivity. The
imports of goods remain the most important channel for technical efficiency gains at the
country level. Patents and FDI bear similar effects in magnitude, followed by technological
acquisition via licensing. The impacts for all these variables except patenting are greater
in the case of transition countries than for the developed ones, suggesting that all these
international interactions bear significant benefits for emerging countries in terms of growth
and catching-up.
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3.5.2 Separate estimations of each channel for spillovers
Considering the potential problems in estimating the concurrent spillovers via these channels,
I employ also an alternative strategy by estimating them in separate regressions. Table
6 reports these estimations using sequentially the three spillover channels and technology
licensing as explanatory variables for total factor productivity. Very similar results are
obtained for countries’ levels of technical efficiency; the results are not reported here due
to space constraints but are available upon request. Overall, all these factors have robust
positive effects on TFP and technical efficiency. Western economies gain through trade, FDI
and patent related spillovers while transition economies benefit from trade, FDI and direct
licensing of technologies. The effects of trade appear more significant in the case of developed
economies, while FDI has a bigger impact in transition countries, although when analyzing
technical efficiency the latter seem to have greater benefits across the board. Similar to
previous estimations, patent related spillovers are significant only for Western economies
while technology licensing determines productivity of transition economies.
3.5.3 Additional controls
So far, consistent with the endogenous growth theory, it has been assumed that technological
progress is driven by R&D efforts (domestic and foreign) and human capital endowments.
Thus to isolate the effect of spillovers in the regressions, I have employed a fixed-effects
estimator. However, it is possible that other factors play a role as well, especially in emerging
markets represented in this context by Central Asian and Eastern European economies.
Therefore, I have added several other variables that are considered in the literature: financial
development, openness (to trade, FDI and patents) and infrastructure. All these factors have
been considered as important determinant of economic development in different streams of
literature. Financial development reduces transaction costs, paving the way for more trade
and FDI, as well as providing an easier access to credit, which translates into superior
investments in capital and R&D [3,4]. Governmental policies with respect to trade, FDI and
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patenting affect directly the amount and composition of these flows, which in turn affects
the quality and amount of potential spillovers [59]. Finally, the significance of infrastructure
in the development (growth) process has been heavily documented by prior literature [79].
Good infrastructure facilitates workers mobility , reduces transaction costs and stimulates
an efficient allocation of inputs, all of which result in productivity improvements. In terms
of data, these indicators are drawn from the World Bank statistics: financial development
data accounts liquid liabilities to GDP ratio (IFC database), infrastructure is proxied by the
total telephone subscribers (fixed-line plus mobile) per 1000 inhabitants (World Development
Indicators), while openness in x dimension is computed as inward plus outward flows of x over
GDP, where x stands for flows of trade, FDI and patents. Again, not all results are reported
here due to space constraints, however, they are available upon request. Overall, I find that
the magnitude and ranks of spillovers remain similar to the previous estimations. Table 7
(Models 31 through 35) presents some of these results (in the case of trade related spillovers).
Among the openness measures employed, trade and financial (FDI) aspects appear to have
positive and statistically significant effects on productivity, while patent openness has a weak
negative one. Financial development and existing infrastructure have positive coefficients,
although the statistical significance of the latter is lower. Throughout these estimations the
coefficient of the spillover variable (in this case, trade) remains positive and highly significant.
Similar regressions were carried out for the rest of the postulated spillover channels and the
results follow closely the conclusions enunciated so far.
3.5.4 Interaction effects
Often, following [27] the literature explores the interaction between foreign R&D spillovers
and the degree of openness of an economy to cater the possibility that economies which are
more open, would also benefit more in terms of capturing these spillovers. Therefore I focus
on three potential interactions between spillovers and domestic R&D efforts (absorptive ca-
pacity potential), infrastructure (development level) and trade openness, all with important
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consequences for economic theory and policy practice. The results of this exercise in the
case of trade related spillovers are reported in Table 7 (Models 36-38). They support the
absorptive capacity story (positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction
between domestic R&D stock and spillover variable) and free trade benefits (the more open
a country is in can take better advantage of these spillovers).
4 Discussion, implications and conclusions
Fuelled by R&D investments and robust innovation systems that blend successfully firms,
institutions and universities, productivity is seen as the main engine of economic growth
and development. However, in practice, only few countries posses the financial endowments
and functional systems to harness it properly. Some exceptions to this conventional wisdom
includes several Asian ”miracles” that managed to leap-frog towards the world’s technological
frontier in an impressive manner. However, most developing nations lag far behind developed
nations and are increasingly dependent on foreign sources of innovation to reduce this gap.
Thus, especially for these countries, identifying channels through which such transfers occur
and their relative efficiency, is of great significance.
The objective of this paper was two-folded: first, to quantify and rank in importance the
impact of embodied and disembodied international R&D spillovers on domestic productivity
of countries; secondly, to distinguish the magnitude of these effects in different stages of
development. Using a newly developed dataset that quantifies spillovers via three spillovers
channels (trade, foreign direct investment and patenting) plus technological imports, I ana-
lyze their relative effectiveness across 47 transition and developed economies over a period
of 19 years.
The results support all postulated channels as sources for international technological
spillovers. As expected, trade remains the main distributor of foreign technological content
that impacts the domestic productivity of firms via superior intermediate goods. A bit sur-
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prising, the effects are quite similar between developed and transition economies, a bit larger
for the latter in some specifications, suggesting that the gains from trade in relative terms
favor these group of countries, and contributing more towards their development than in the
case of advanced industrialized economies. Trade is followed in magnitude by inward FDI,
which has the second largest effect in terms of technical spillovers on productivity. While
most FDI still occurs between developed nations, emerging markets’ shares are growing at
an exponential rate. Beyond the direct effects of inward FDI in terms of growth and employ-
ment, I find that these flows are also associated with large R&D spillovers via equipment,
personnel and know-how that gets transferred with MNEs shifting activities. Thirdly, for-
eign patenting (i.e. done abroad) represents a channel through which technology diffuses to
other countries. If a company needs to protect its intellectual property in a market it usually
decides to apply for a local patent; subsequently, this information becomes publicly available
in the local language to any other interested parties, hence opening up avenues for future
local contributions in this domain. Spillovers from foreign patenting appear significant only
for developed (Western) nations that have extensive patent pools, better IPR systems, and
larger exchanges of FDI, all of which would encourage intense bilateral patenting. Finally,
direct acquisition of foreign technologies (licensing) represents a straightforward channel to
boost one’s productivity, and its effects appear to be significant for transition countries, prob-
ably due to selection effects and their relative backwardness vis-a-vis to technologies they
acquire, translating into significant improvements noticeable also at the aggregate level.
Overall, my results confirm trade as the main carrier of embodied technology for all coun-
tries. The estimated elasticities of imports are large under all econometric specifications and
have the highest statistical significance among all spillovers computed. This finding is consis-
tent with the classical Ricardian argument for gains from trade openness and specialization,
but also with the more recent ”export-led growth” story, where countries can leapfrog in the
global wealth distribution by shifting their specialization to more sophisticated (and with
higher technological content) goods. Such achievements are usually the result of both con-
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certed development national agendas and decentralized efforts of local firm to learn foreign
processes and reverse engineer imported products.
Both patent-related and FDI spillovers have a smaller and less robust influence on do-
mestic productivity. In the case of the former, this is particularly important since many
national agencies promote and encourage aggressively MNEs to set-up shop in developing
economies aiming for better regional and national growth perspectives (e.g. export process-
ing zones, tax incentives). These results suggest that FDI bears positive spillovers both for
developed and developing nations and that on average, the benefits appear to be larger for
the latter. This is consistent with the results of a recent meta-analysis by Meyer and Sinani
[62] showing a non-linear relationship between the development level of a country and the
amount of spillovers it receives via foreign investments. However, it is obvious that these
effects are much smaller in productivity terms that those coming from trade integration.
Finally, direct imports of technologies, proxied by the stream of payments on royalties
and licenses from abroad, contribute significantly to domestic TFP of transition economies.
Their impact seconds that of trade and FDI related spillovers and their statistical relevance
remains robust throughout estimations. This finding complements Mendi’s [60] results in
the case of OECD countries, providing new evidence for the importance of markets for
technologies in the case of transition economies. The data shows significant outward streams
of payments that increase over the 1990s in these countries signalling an intensification of
technological links with various foreign partners.
From a policy perspective, these results emphasize the importance of trade relations
(both in flows of goods and technologies) followed by foreign direct investment and foreign
patenting. However, these effects are unevenly distributed between developed (Western) and
transition (Eastern) countries, and moreover within these groups. In the case of transition
economies, the friction is clear between Eastern Europeans (CEECs) and former Soviet
countries (CISCs), as a result of differentials in both initial conditions and subsequent policy
mixes. All else equal, the former have implemented radical reforms, opened up quickly to
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trade and foreign investments, and focus their economic activity to integrate within a larger
Europe by joining the EU. In contrast, the latter opted for a more gradual approach that
has not proved to be equally successful and are still much dependent on Russia in terms of
trade and investments. Thus, improving their openness and diversifying across the economic
and innovative spectrum, complemented by domestic efforts to spur and grow absorptive
capabilities and reliable institutions could be key ingredients for faster development in the
region.
The process of globalization has generated unprecedented liberalization of trade and pro-
liferation of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes worldwide. These forces have
contributed also to the increasing importance of rent and knowledge spillovers in determining
economic productivity, especially in developing countries that do not perform much R&D on
their own. This study provides empirical evidence of their effects in the case of 47 countries
and assesses their relative importance suggesting that some of the ”usual suspects” (i.e. FDI
in developed nations) might not be as important as previously thought, while others (e.g.
cross-country patenting, international licensing) have yet to be explored in depth.
However, the above results must be met with caution given the inherent methodological
and data limitations, specially salient for transition countries. For example, licensing as a
weight of disembodied knowledge assumes that measures a significant amount of technol-
ogy transfer beyond the intra-group (parent-subsidiary) flows, often dictated by local factors
(e.g. tax regimes, growth perspectives, firm strategy). Similarly, patent counts are indicative
of the amount and direction of knowledge transfers but they could be further strengthened
strengthened by using citation weights as a signal for quality. However, due to the limitations
of the bilateral patenting data used, this is not feasible for transition economies. Thirdly,
given the significant disparities in terms of R&D investments between transition and de-
veloped nations, I assume negligible spillovers from the latter to the former. Subsequent
contributions may distinguish between developed-to-transition and transition-to-transition
R&D spillovers to formally test this assumption. Further refinements may include sector
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or micro-level data on R&D capital, bilateral patenting and foreign investments can pro-
vide more insights on the issue of spillovers. Finally, valuable contributions can be made
in explaining differences in adoption and absorbing foreign technologies between countries
via multiple channels by exploring both sides of the equation (productivity and sources of
improvements) in an exhaustive way, and test possible mediating effects that exploit both
temporal and cross-sectional heterogeneity. International variations in terms of business be-
havior, patenting or cultural norms, all central to this line of research, may yield interesting
empirical and theoretical contributions to the field.
25
References
[1] Acharya R.C., and W. Keller. 2007. Estimating the Productivity Selection and Tech-
nology Spillover Effects of Imports. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
RePEc. Available: http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/14079.html.
[2] Aitken B., and Harrison A., 1999. Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Foreign Direct
Investment? Evidence from Venezuala. American Economic Review. 89(3): 605-
618.
[3] Ang, J.B., 2011. Financial development, liberalization and technological deepening.
European Economic Review 55:688-701.
[4] Ang, J.B., Madsen, J., 2012. International R&D Spillovers and Productivity Trends in
the Asian Miracle Economies (Forthcoming in Economic Inquiry).
[5] Anwar, S. and Nguyen, L.P., 2010. Foreign direct investment and export spillovers:
Evidence from Vietnam. International Business Review. In Press, Corrected Proof.
[6] Arora A., Fosfuri A., and Gambardella A., 2001. Markets for technology: the economics
of innovation and corporate strategy. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[7] Athreye S. and J. Cantwell, 2007. Creating competition?: Globalisation and the emer-
gence of new technology producers. Research Policy 36, no. 2: 209-226.
[8] Audretsch D. B., and Feldman M. P., 1996. R&D Spillovers and the Geography of
Innovation and Production. American Economic Review 86: 630-640.
[9] Barro, R and J.-W. Lee, 2010. A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the
World, 1950-2010. NBER Working Paper No. 15902,
[10] Bascavusoglu E., and M.P. Zuniga, 2002. Foreign patent rights, technology and disem-
bodied knowledge transfer cross borders: An empirical investigation. Unpublished
manuscript. University of Paris I, France.
[11] Battese, G. E., Coelli, T. J., 1995. A model for technical inefficiency effects in a
stochastic frontier production function for panel data. Empirical Economics, 20,
325-332.
[12] Borensztein, E., J. De Gregorio, and J-W. Lee. 1998. How Does Foreign Direct In-
vestment Affect Economic Growth? Journal of International Economics 45 (1):
115-135.
[13] Branstetter L.G., 2001. Are knowledge spillovers international or intranational in
scope? Microeconometric evidence from the U.S. and Japan. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 53, pp. 5379.
[14] Branstetter L.G., 2006. Is foreign direct investment a channel of knowledge spillovers?
Evidence from Japan’s FDI in the United States. Journal of International Eco-
nomics vol. 68(2), pp. 325–344.
[15] Breitung J., 2000. The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. In: B.
Baltagi (ed), Advances in Econometrics. Vol. 15: Nonstationarity panels, panel
cointegration and dynamic panels. Amsterdam, JAI Press, pp.161-178.
26
[16] Broadman H.G., 2006. From Disintegration to reintegration. Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union in International Trade. The World Bank, Washington DC.
[17] Buckley P.J., Wang C., and J. Clegg, 2007. The impact of foreign ownership, local
ownership and industry characteristics on spillover benefits from foreign direct in-
vestment in China. International Business Review 16 (2): 142-158.
[18] Busse M. and J.L. Groizard, 2008. Foreign direct investment, regulations and growth.
The World Economy 31(7): 861-886
[19] Busse M. and J.L. Groizard, 2008. Technology Trade in Economic Development. The
World Economy 31(4): 569-592
[20] Cassiman B. and R. Veugelers, 2006. In Search of Complementarity in Innovation
Strategy: Internal R&D and External Knowledge Acquisition. Management Science
52, no. 1: 68-82.
[21] Cassiman, B., and R. Veugelers. 2007. Are External Technology Sourcing
Strategies Substitutes or Complements? The Case of Embodied Versus
Disembodied Technology Acquisition. IESE Business School. Available at:
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ebg/iesewp/d-0672.html.
[22] Chandra V. and Kolavalli S., 2006. Technology, adaptation and exports: how some
developing countries got it right. In: Technology, adaptation and exports: how
some developing countries got it right (Chandra V., Ed.), pp.1-41, Washington
DC, World Bank.
[23] Chen J. R. and Yang C. H., 2006. The effects of knowledge capital on enhancing firms
productivity in Taiwan: Does R&D or technology import matter? Hitotsubashi
Journal of Economics, 47(2), pp.137-153.
[24] Cincera M. and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B., 2001. International R&D
Spillovers: a Survey. Brussels Economic Review/Cahiers Economiques de Brux-
elles, Editions du DULBEA, Universit libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied
Economics, vol. 0(169), pp. 3-31.
[25] Ciruelos A. and Wang M., 2005. International Technology Diffusion: Effects of Trade
and FDI. Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol.
33(4).
[26] Coe, D.T., Helpman, E. and Hoffmaister, A. W., 2009. International R&D spillovers
and institutions, European Economic Review, Elsevier 53(7): 723-741.
[27] Coe D., and E. Helpman, 1995. International R&D spillovers. European Economic
Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(5).
[28] Coe, D., Helpman E. and A. Hoffmaister, 1997. North-South R&D Spillovers. Economic
Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(440).
[29] Correa C. M., 2005. Can the TRIPS agreement foster technology transfer to developing
countries? In K. E. Maskus, and J. H. Reichman (Eds.), International public
goods and transfer of technology under a globalized intellectual property regime.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
27
[30] Djankov S. and Hoekman B., 2000. Foreign investment and productivity growth in
Czech enterprises. World Bank Econ. Rev. 14, pp. 4964.
[31] Eaton J. and Kortum S., 1999. International Technology Diffusion: Theory and Mea-
surement. International Economic Review vol. 40(3): 537-70.
[32] Furman J. and R. Hayes, 2004. Catching Up or Standing Still? National Innovative
Productivity among Follower Nations, Research Policy 33: 1329-1354.
[33] Gans J. and S. Stern, 2000. Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale
of Creative Destruction . Journal of Economics and Management Strategy vol. 9:
485-511.
[34] Ghauri P.N., and M. Yamin, 2009. Revisiting the impact of multinational enterprises
on economic development. Journal of World Business 44 (2): 105-107.
[35] Gorg, H. and D. Greenaway, 2004. Much ado about nothing? Do domestic firms really
benefit from foreign direct investment? World Bank Research Observer 19(2): 171-
197.
[36] Griffith R., Redding S. and H. Simpson, 2004. Foreign Ownership and Productivity:
New Evidence from the Service Sector and the R&D Lab. CEP Discussion Papers
dp0649, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
[37] Griliches Z., 1979. Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development
to Productivity Growth. Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol.
10(1), pp. 92-116.
[38] Grossman G. and E. Helpman, 1991. Innovation and growth in the global economy.
MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
[39] Gu Q. and J.W. Lu, 2010. Effects of inward investment on outward investment: The
venture capital industry worldwide 1985-2007. Journal of International Business
Studies 42: 263–284.
[40] Hadri K., 2000. Testing for nonstationarity in heterogeneous panel data. Econometrics
Journal 3 (2): 148-161.
[41] Hall R. and C. Jones, 1999. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output
per Worker than Others? NBER Working Papers 6564.
[42] Hall, B.H., 2011. The internationalization of R&D. UNU-MERIT Working Paper
Series. Available at: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/dgrunumer/2011049.htm
(Accessed November 1, 2011).
[43] Harhoff D., 1996. Strategic Spillovers and Incentives for Research and Development.
Management Science 42, no. 6: 907-925.
[44] Hausmann R., Hwang J. and D. Rodrik., 2007. What you export matters. Journal of
Economic Growth 12 (1): 1-25.
[45] Im K., Pesaran M. and Y. Shin, 2003. Testing for unit root in heterogeneous panels.
Journal of Econometrics 115 (1): 53-74.
28
[46] Jaffe A.B., Trajtenberg M. and R. Henderson, 1993. Geographic Localization of Knowl-
edge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pp. 577-598.
[47] Javorcik, B.S., 2004. Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domes-
tic firms? In search of spillovers through backward linkages. American Economic
Review 94(3): 605-627.
[48] Kao C. and M. Chiang, 2000. On the estimation and inference of a cointegrated re-
gression in panel data. Advances in Econometrics 15, pp.179-222.
[49] Keller W., 2004. International Technology Diffusion. Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 42(3).
[50] Kim J.W. and H.K. Lee, 2004. Embodied and disembodied international spillovers of
R&D in OECD manufacturing industries. Technovation 24: 359-368.
[51] Kinoshita, Y., 2001. R&D and Technology Spillovers through FDI: Innova-
tion and Absorptive Capacity, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. Available at:
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/2775.html (Accessed November 1, 2011).
[52] Krammer M.S.S., 2009. Drivers of national innovation in transition: Evidence from a
panel of Eastern European countries. Research Policy 38 (5): 845-860.
[53] Krammer M.S.S., 2010. International R&D spillovers in emerging markets: the impact
of trade and foreign direct investment. The Journal of International Trade and
Economic Development 19: 591-623.
[54] Le, T., 2010. Are student flows a significant channel of R&D spillovers from the north
to the south?. Economic Letters, 107 (3): 315-317.
[55] Lee G., 2005. The effectiveness of international knowledge spillover channels. European
Economic Review 50: 2075-2088.
[56] Levin A., Lin C. and C. Chu, 2002. Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and
finite sample properties. Journal of Econometrics 108: 1-24.
[57] Lichtenberg F. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1998. International R&D
spillovers: a comment. European Economic Review 42(8): 1483-91.
[58] Los B. and B. Verspagen, 2007. Technology Spillovers and Their Impact on Productiv-
ity. In: H. Hanusch and A. Pyka (eds.), Elgar Companion to Neo-Schumpeterian
Economics, Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 574-593.
[59] Madsen, J.B., 2009. Trade barriers, openness and economic growth. Southern Economic
Journal 76: 753-767.
[60] Mendi P., 2005. The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Ev-
idence from Spain. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Blackwell
Publishing, vol. 14(2), pp. 403-429.
[61] Mendi P., 2007. Trade in disembodied technology and total factor productivity in
OECD countries. Research PolicyVolume 36 (1), pp. 121-133.
29
[62] Meyer K.E. and E. Sinani, 2009. When and where does foreign direct investment
generate positive spillovers? A meta-analysis. Journal of International Business
Studies 40, no. 4: 1075-1094.
[63] Moretti E., 2002. Human Capital Spillovers in Manufacturing: Evidence from Plant-
Level Production Functions. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
Series No. 9316.
[64] Mowery D.C. and J. E. Oxley, 1995. Inward technology transfer and competitiveness:
the role of national innovation systems. Cambridge Journal of Economics 19, no.
1: 67 -93.
[65] Nelson R. and E. Phelps, 1996. Investment in humans, technological diffusion and
economic growth. The American Economic Review, Papers and proceedings, 61,
pp. 69-75.
[66] Park W.G., 1995. International R&D spillovers and OECD economic growth. Economic
Inquiry 33: 571-591.
[67] Park, J. 2004. International Student Flows and R&D Spillovers. Economics Letters 82
(3): 315-320.
[68] Pedroni P., 1999. Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with
multiple regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61, 653-670.
[69] Pedroni P., 2004. Panel cointegration; Asymptotic and finite sample properties of
pooled time series tests with an application to the purchasing power parity hy-
pothesis. Econometric Theory 20 (3), pp. 597-625.
[70] Pisano G.P., 1990. The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis. Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly 35 (1): 153-176.
[71] Riviera-Batiz L. and P. Romer, 1991. Economic integration and endogenous growth.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 531-556.
[72] Saggi K., 2004. International technology transfer to developing countries. London:
Commonwealth Secretariat.
[73] Singh J., M. Marx and L. Fleming, 2010. Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowl-
edge Spillovers: Disentangling the Role of State Borders, Metropolitan Boundaries
and Distance. INSEAD working paper 2010/03/ST. (Accessed November 10, 2011)
[74] Shih, H.-Y. and S.T. Chang, 2009. International diffusion of embodied and disembodied
technology: A network analysis approach. Technological Forecasting and Social
Change 76, no. 6: 821-834.
[75] Tang, L. and Koveos, P.E., 2008. Embodied and disembodied R&D spillovers to de-
veloped and developing countries. International Business Review, 17(5): 546-558.
[76] Teece D.J., 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration,
collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy 15, no.6: 285-305.
[77] Thompson P., 2006. Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge Spillovers:
Evidence from Inventor- and Examiner-added Citations. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(2), pp. 383-388.
30
[78] Vernon, R., 1966. International Investment and International Trade in the Product
Cycle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80(2): 190-207.
[79] Wang M., Wong M.C., 2012. International R&D transfer and technical efficiency: Ev-
idence from a panel study using stochastic frontier analysis. World Development
40: 1982-1998.
[80] Wei, Y., and Liu, X. 2006. Productivity spillovers from R&D, exports and FDI in
China’s manufacturing sector. Journal of International Business Studies, 37(4):
544557.
[81] Xu B. and E. Chiang, 2005. Trade, patents and international technology diffusion.
Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, Vol. 14, No.1, pp.115-
135.
[82] Xu B. and J. Wang, 1999. Capital goods, trade and R&D spillovers in the OECD,
Canadian Journal of Economics, 32, pp.1258-74.
[83] Zhu L. and B.N. Jeon, 2007. International R&D Spillovers: Trade, FDI, and Informa-
tion Technology as Spillover Channels, Review of International Economics, 15(5):
955-976.
[84] Zuniga M.P. and D. Guellec, 2009. Who Licenses out Patents and Why?: Lessons
from a Business Survey.OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers
2009/5, OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry.
31
A Data and variable construction
A.1 Classification of countries in the dataset:
• OECD countries : Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America.
• Central and Eastern European transition countries (CEECs): Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia.
• Commonwealth of Independent States transition countries (CISCs): Armenia, Belarus,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajik-
istan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine.
In the estimation tables, I refer to Western European countries (wec) as all European
OECD countries bolded above plus several small European states (Cyprus, Luxembourg,
Malta), while transition countries (trc) include both CISCs and CEECs.
A.2 Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM)
This is a frequently employed method for converting flow variables into stocks. Suppose that
the following relationship holds in a steady state situation between the steady state value
(S∗) and its flow value (F ∗):
(1 + g)t+1S∗ = (1− δ)(1 + g)tS∗ + (1 + g)tF ∗ (9)
where t = 0, ..., T , g represents the average growth rate of this variable in this period and
δ is a constant depreciation rate. Solving for the stock value we get that S∗ = F
∗
(δ+g)
.
Assuming a positive growth rate over time, the expected value of stocks and flows of this
variable are given by:
E(St) = (1 + g)
tS∗ (10)
E(Ft) = (1 + g)
tF ∗ (11)
The initial stock value can be determined as:
S0 = E(St) =
E(Ft)
(δ + g)
(12)
while subsequent stocks are assumed to depreciate linearly by δ from t = 1, ..., T :
St = (1− δ)St−1 + Ft−1 (13)
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Variable Description Summary Statistics
all wec trc
log TFPit Log Total Factor Productivity 1.816 2.211 1.754
(0.533) (0.175) (0.744)
Tech Eff Technical Efficiency 0.703 0.865 0.572
(0.213) (0.892) (0.194)
log school Log schooling years adult 2.204 2.126 2.196
(0.242) (0.183) (0.279)
log DRD Log domestic R&D stock 8.382 9.684 7.411
(2.208) (1.898) (1.902)
log STRADE Log Trade Spillovers 7.105 8.857 3.976
(2.331) (1.471) (2.199)
log SFDI Log FDI spillovers 5.390 7.326 2.317
(3.511) (2.963) (2.170)
log SPAT Log Patent spillovers 3.277 4.106 0.965
(2.111) (1.808) (1.354)
log MTECH Log Technology imports 6.461 9.109 6.555
(6.117) (6.294) (8.628)
Table 2: Means and standard deviations by country groups
Notes: wec refers to Western Europe and trcc are transition countries from Central Eastern and Southern Europe plus former
Sovier Republics from Central Asia.
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Country log TFP Tech effic log STRADE log SFDI log SPAT log MTECH Avg spill
United Kingdom 2.31 0.96 10.57 11.46 7.33 15.71 9.79
Germany 2.11 0.75 10.88 9.89 7.39 15.46 9.39
France 2.29 0.90 10.53 9.95 6.27 14.61 8.92
Netherlands 2.21 0.87 10.18 10.93 4.38 14.60 8.50
Italy 2.23 0.86 10.14 8.45 5.42 14.12 8.00
Belgium 2.29 0.93 10.08 9.55 3.54 13.95 7.72
Spain 2.17 0.82 9.75 8.57 4.15 12.41 7.49
Switzerland 2.01 0.70 9.43 8.31 4.31 7.35
Norway 2.32 0.92 8.56 7.59 5.63 11.88 7.26
Sweden 2.17 0.85 9.24 7.86 4.57 14.01 7.22
Ireland 2.43 0.91 8.62 9.02 2.76 15.29 6.80
Austria 2.18 0.87 9.16 7.15 4.02 13.37 6.78
Finland 2.11 0.82 8.35 7.45 3.94 13.04 6.58
Denmark 2.25 0.92 8.59 7.12 3.17 6.30
Turkey 1.84 0.65 8.40 4.36 5.70 6.15
Portugal 2.26 0.89 8.38 6.37 1.93 10.18 5.56
Greece 2.10 0.86 8.15 5.10 1.13 11.39 4.79
Cyprus 2.15 0.90 6.25 4.85 2.43 9.56 4.51
Iceland 2.19 0.87 5.89 0.58 2.99 7.00 3.15
Malta 2.09 0.85 5.98 0.89 2.16 3.01
Russian Federation 1.16 0.31 8.56 6.17 6.71 11.12 7.15
Poland 1.76 0.62 8.46 6.56 5.40 12.53 6.81
Hungary 1.75 0.66 7.94 7.27 4.74 11.99 6.65
Czech Republic 1.75 0.64 8.30 6.35 4.75 11.39 6.47
Romania 1.15 0.37 7.01 3.92 3.92 10.43 4.95
Slovakia 1.76 0.63 7.03 4.36 3.33 11.14 4.91
Ukraine 0.80 0.23 6.61 3.16 4.32 12.53 4.70
Croatia 2.01 0.71 6.74 3.57 3.28 10.91 4.53
Bulgaria 2.04 0.80 6.17 3.25 4.13 10.05 4.52
Estonia 2.12 0.78 5.96 4.24 2.96 8.74 4.39
Slovenia 2.06 0.75 7.13 3.11 1.37 10.53 3.87
Latvia 2.06 0.77 5.82 3.46 2.03 7.55 3.77
Serbia 1.40 0.54 5.25 1.84 3.38 3.49
Kazakhstan 1.65 0.60 5.48 3.49 0.99 9.86 3.32
Lithuania 1.68 0.63 6.08 2.03 0.44 8.78 2.85
Uzbekistan 1.52 0.55 5.04 1.27 2.18 2.83
Azerbaijan 1.52 0.69 4.38 3.30 0.21 5.47 2.63
Bosnia Herzegovina 2.27 0.83 4.84 -0.15 3.02 2.57
Macedonia 1.55 0.61 4.95 0.73 2.02 8.50 2.57
Belarus 1.49 0.52 5.29 -0.43 2.10 8.11 2.32
Turkmenistan 0.79 0.29 3.86 1.52 0.58 1.99
Kyrgyzstan 1.10 0.48 2.89 1.83 -0.16 7.49 1.52
Moldova 0.75 0.26 3.83 0.27 6.89 1.37
Armenia 1.61 0.71 3.63 0.68 -0.41 1.30
Albania 0.93 0.51 4.29 -0.42 8.63 1.29
Georgia 1.65 0.69 3.93 -0.95 0.75 8.94 1.24
Tajikistan 0.42 0.21 2.50 -0.52 5.48 0.66
Table 8: Relative magnitude of spillovers and direct technology imports (average, 1990-2009)
Note: The upper part of the table lists Western European nations plus Turkey, while the lower part includes transition countries
from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. TFP is total factor productivity; Technical Efficiency is obtained from stochastic frontier
productivity analysis; STRADE , SFDI , SPAT are computed spillovers from trade, FDI, and respectively patents; MTECH
represents payments and royalties for foreign technologies acquisitions
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